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ABSTRACT 
The construction industry has, over a long period, been criticised for its short term 
“hit-and-run” relationships which are focused on win-lose situations and poor 
performance. Despite the wide recognition of these problems the industry persistently 
resists the radical change demanded of it. This paper attempts to investigate why this 
might be the case by reviewing prevailing safeguarding practices within the current 
commercial systems and structures through literature review and industry observation.  
Findings reveal that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-
specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of 
formal contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and 
structures typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the 
detriment of the project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are 
safeguarded, clients and decision makers feel they have taken the best course of 
action. This goes a long way to explaining the coherence of the current construction 
model and provides the basic information for preparing a route to the radical change 
required to move to lean methodologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During his presentation at the IGLC204 Industry Day in San Diego in 2012, Gregory 
Howell the then president of the Lean Construction Institute, referred to the 
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prevailing construction approach as a “very coherent model” when explaining the 
barriers to lean implementation. Yet the performance of the industry has been widely 
criticised, often regarded as confrontational, risk averse, and lacking trust and 
capacity for innovation and improvement (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008) all of which suggests that despite its apparent 
coherence, the current model is not very good. Why therefore is the model so 
coherent and so embedded? This paper uses Transaction Cost Economics to begin to 
explain the current inertia focusing particularly on the idea of self-interest (or safe-
guarding) and how this is a source of waste hitherto unacknowledged.  
     Waste in construction originally addressed physical waste but the discussion 
widened with the introduction of process waste identified in lean thinking. Both of 
these types of waste can be directly associated with production. In this we can say 
that production is about doing work of some sort and that this includes the production 
of design information and specification.  This understanding of waste encourages the 
improvement of current processes rather than radical new system design. Does this go 
part way to explain why Liker (2004) and Spear & Bowen (2006) observe many lean 
implementations stalling and not achieving their full potential?  A wider examination 
and conception of waste is needed and one aspect of this is the consideration of the 
organisational, commercial and institutional environments that surround the design 
and delivery of construction projects. The foundation for understanding waste begins 
with defining value which in turn enables non-value to be identified. Traditionally 
waste (non-value) has been identified as anything that consumes resources but adds 
no value – the constituents of value have similarly been widely discussed but again 
mostly from within the design and delivery processes. It is clear that some non-value 
is essential and that much of this is in the logistical and supporting structures 
surrounding project delivery. The understanding of value and non-value (waste) 
within the wider organisational, commercial and institutional environments is more 
difficult to conceptualise not least because it requires a critical evaluation of the 
activities of different professions (e.g. lawyers, accountants, human resource 
managers, quantity surveyors and so on) and varying organisational 
cultures/structures/systems/behaviours. 
This evaluation also has to draw upon theory from disciplines outside both 
construction and manufacturing such as economics, law and sociology, if we are to 
begin to explain the phenomenon of coherence within the current construction project 
delivery approach. The current approach contains many inefficiencies that have been 
frequently attributed to factors such as fragmentation of the industry (Egan, 1998; 
Sarhan and Fox, 2013), adversarial hierarchy structure of construction projects 
(Ghassemi, and Becerik-Gerber, 2011), obsolete procurement methods (Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007), confusing and treacherous contractual arrangements (Hawkins, 2012; 
Cox, and Thompson, 1997), the highly competitive cost-driven environment (Bresnen 
and Marshall, 2000) and the sequential organisation of construction processes 
(Koskela, 2000). Due to the transient and discrete nature of many of the construction 
projects, clients and decision makers, in practice, tend to recognise these as risks and 
seek to protect their project-specific investments and assets, from exploitation and 
opportunism, through the deployment of formal contractual arrangements and 
governance mechanisms. Since, most of the clients who procure construction projects 
lack experience and may only ever build once or twice (Love et al., 2010); they 
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invariably seek advice from lawyers and from those who are familiar with 
construction contracts and the laws related to them (e.g. quantity surveyors). These 
lawyers or consultants would accordingly be paid, as part of their agreed fees, for 
providing means for safeguarding their client’s rights and transaction-specific assets. 
Unsurprisingly, in some cases these means can, for example, include the use of 
privileged conditions of contract, where clients may not mind protecting themselves 
from any risks, even if, this occurs at the expense of others and ultimately themselves. 
An example of this can be found in the inappropriate risk allocation in the use of 
disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses which can attract between 8% - 20% of the total 
project cost as contingency (Zaghloul and Hartman 2003). This is potentially an 
example of a contingency that clearly consumes resource without adding practical 
value and thus conforms to the archetypal definition of waste. However, in most cases, 
clients’ main intentions are to control opportunism and utilise efficient governance of 
their transactions. But, arguably, they may not be aware of how their procurement 
decisions and arrangements may affect the likelihood of creating a cooperative 
environment (Eriksson et al., 2008) and thus impact project performance and 
outcomes. According to Williamson (2000) “Any issue that arises as or can be 
reformulated as a contracting issue can be examined to advantage in transaction cost 
economising terms” (p599, 608).  Thus, transaction cost economics (TCE) seems to 
provide insights into why current practice seems to be coherent by explaining a model 
focused on managing contracts rather than managing production (i.e. the concepts of 
waste and flow as understood in lean thinking). 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
It is Coase’s seminal article "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) which explicitly 
introduced the concept of transaction costs into economic analysis; and drew to our 
attention that there are transaction costs that had been assumed to be zero in prior 
theorizing. Oliver Williamson and his fellows have subsequently added refinements 
to Coase's general arguments (see e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1985, 2000; North, 1994). 
Transaction costs are the costs of specifying what is being exchanged and of 
enforcing the consequent agreements (i.e. contractual clauses) against the exchange 
partner (North, 1994; Ting et al., 2007). In this approach the focus is on the 
transaction or “doing the deal” rather than “doing the work” and is typified by the 
frequent complaint from a variety of practitioners that re-tendering sub-contract 
packages in order to reduce cost usually causes costly knock-on problems. By riding 
roughshod over relationships the constant drive to reduce cost often has the opposite 
effect, causing margin slippage and increasing the likelihood of costly dispute as all 
parties seek to safeguard their financial position. Williamson (1975) categorises 
transaction costs into ex-ante and ex-post costs. Ex-ante costs comprise the costs of 
tendering, negotiating and writing the contract (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997); while 
ex-post costs include the costs of monitoring and measuring performance, 
implementing quality control systems, cost accounting, establishing layers of the 
managerial hierarchy, and dispute resolution processes (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
The TCE framework is underpinned by the interaction between two fundamental 
assumptions of human behaviour (i.e. opportunism and bounded rationality) and two 
key dimensions of transactions (i.e. asset specificity and uncertainty). There is also a 
third behavioural assumption of risk neutrality and a third transactional dimension of 
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transaction frequency or relational exchange (Williamson, 1985).  In this opportunism 
as "self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) implies that given the 
opportunity, decision makers may deceitfully seek to serve their self-interests. Muris 
(1981, p. 521, cited in Ting et al., 2007) adds to this and argues that opportunism 
arises when a party “behaves contrary to the other party’s understanding of their 
contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a 
transfer of wealth from one party to the other.” In reality, opportunistic behaviours 
are part of human nature, and therefore they often exist in exchange-relationships 
(Ting et al., 2007). However, it can be argued that although opportunism may, 
initially, lead to increased outcomes for the opportunistic party, it actually has the 
potential to restrict value creation and decrease revenues for both parties in a 
relationship (Wathne and Heide, 2000); that is because considerable amounts of 
resources would then have to be spent on enforcing, monitoring and controlling 
functions instead of employing those resources for other productive purposes (Ting et 
al., 2007). Bounded rationality simply means that decision makers act rationally but 
have constraints on their cognitive, analytical and data-processing capabilities, 
especially in uncertain and complex environments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
According to Dietrich (1994: 19), the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ in transactions 
is based on two principles. First, that there are limits on a human’s ability to process 
information without error. Secondly, that it is not wise to suggest that past experience 
can help in every situation encountered. Asset specificity refers to investments 
(transaction specific assets) that have a ‘lock-in effect’ (Ting et al., 2007) because 
they make it difficult to terminate a relationship and select other parties without 
acquiring losses. Uncertainty can be defined in its simplest form as what is known in 
comparison to what needs to be known. During transactions (ex-ante and ex-post 
contractual stages), two types of uncertainty are encountered: behavioural and 
environmental transaction uncertainty. TCE conceptualises ‘behavioural uncertainty’ 
as the amount of difficulty associated with monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of the exchange partners against established contractual agreements; 
while ‘environmental uncertainty’ is theorised as unanticipated changes in 
circumstances and the associated complexity surrounding the transaction context 
(Williamson, 1985). 
In short, TC theory assumes that the greater the transaction uncertainty and asset 
specificity and the lower the transaction frequency, the higher the transaction costs 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989). This understanding underpins much of the accepted 
procurement theory and practice taught in Universities and recommended by 
professional institutions. It also suggests that exchange cannot be fully specified ex 
ante, and that contractual performance cannot be easily verified ex post, due to 
bounded rationality and uncertainty factors (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Having 
provided an explanation to the theory’s constructs and main assumptions; next we 
discuss the consequences of the interplay that occurs between these constructs, which 
in turn lead to a number of governance challenges. 
THE SAFEGUARDING PROBLEM AND THE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 
A ‘safeguarding problem’ arises when a firm deploys transaction-specific assets and 
worries that its exchange-partner may opportunistically try to exploit these unique 
investments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
asset specificity and opportunism are the antecedents of the safeguarding problem. 
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Figure 1 represents a simplified graphical representation of the governance problems 
and possible solutions. 
According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), the basic premise of TC analysis is 
that if those three governance problems described above are absent or low, decision-
makers will accordingly favour market governance to vertical integration (the make-
or-buy decision). Alternatively, if the transaction costs required for overcoming the 
governance problems exceed the production cost advantages of the market, firms will 
favour internal organization (Coase, 1937). Williamson (1985) has augmented this 
conventional approach to transaction economising and introduced the concept of 
‘relational contracting’ as a more positive and sustaining form of governance which 
solves governance problems through behavioural norms rather than potential 
sanctions (Ting et al, 2007).  
Figure 1: A basic model of transactional governance problems and solutions 
In essence, TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997) and assumes that transactions will be governed by the institutional 
arrangements that are most efficient (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). This implies that, 
according to TCE, the institutional arrangement chosen will be that which reduces the 
total costs (transactional or organizational costs plus production costs) of undertaking 
and coordinating those activities. 
Similarly, clients when deploying their procurement arrangements in general, and 
safeguarding techniques and approaches in specific, should therefore put into 
consideration the impact of their decisions on project-team’s performance and total 
costs. The situation in construction however does not confirm to this explanation as 
the numerous one-off construction clients and their decision makers attempt to 
implement a “buy-it” transaction in a “make-it” environment where a team comes 
together for a specific purpose (to deliver the project). The consistent failure of this 
approach to perform has created increasingly draconian and wasteful activity in order 
to safeguard parties from the failures. There are many safeguarding approaches used 
in construction procurement and these include the use of disclaimer clauses; 
conventional insurance arrangements; collateral warranties; performance bonds and 
cash retentions; lump sum pricing strategies. The discussion of imperfect 
safeguarding approaches used in construction must start with an examination of 
standard forms of contact. 
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STANDARD FORMS OF CONTRACT - AN IMPERFECT 
SAFEGUARDING APPROACH IN CONSTRUCTION  
Construction parties rely heavily on contract formalisation through the use of 
standard forms of contracts (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Theoretically, standard forms 
of contract optimise the balance of risk and responsibility between the parties, and 
eliminate ex-ante transactional costs required for re-drafting and getting familiar with 
new contracts (Cox and Thompson, 1997). Their main advantage is that they enable a 
body of experience in their use to be developed among the whole industry 
(Williamson et al., 2004). This includes the formation of an established body of case 
law which can assist in the drafting and interpretation of contracts (Laryea and 
Hughes, 2009). Thus, as a safeguarding technique, they are supposed to reduce the 
amount of time and risk involved for contract administrators and tenderers as well.  
However, there are many problems related to the use of standard forms of contract. 
These forms of contract are drafted by third parties who focused their formulation of 
the contracts on specific types of projects; thus one of the main problems associated 
with the use of un-amended standard forms of contract is their inability to adapt to the 
context in which they operate (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). Nevertheless, in practice, 
clients rarely use standard-form contracts without making some amendments to them 
(Laryea and Hughes, 2009), and the same applies to subcontracts (Greenwood, 2001). 
A study by Laryea and Hughes (2009) which was based on four observational case 
studies in two of the top contracting companies in the UK, showed that these 
amendments made by clients are mostly related to payment issues and legal 
arrangements. Similarly, an exploratory study of 11 Swedish construction projects, by 
Osipova and Erksson (2011), reported that in all 11 projects, clients made 
amendments to the general conditions of contract to transfer more risks to the 
contractor; many of them were applied to the length of guarantee and additional 
insurance. Laryea and Hughes (2009) revealed that a general perception exists among 
contractors that clients amend conditions of standard contracts and introduce their 
own special clauses, in order to gain an advantage rather than genuinely to suit the 
project needs. Additionally, Hawkins (2012) warns that users making amendments to 
standard forms of contract at negotiation stages do not always ensure that all the 
interlinked clauses affected by the amendments are also amended leading to 
ambiguities and encouraging opportunistic behaviour. Additionally, a study by Love 
et al. (2010) identified onerous and one sided amendments to standard forms, often 
drafted by lawyers to improve their clients’ position, as one of the underlying 
dynamic factors influencing disputes. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasise that lawyers and specialist 
surveyors are not the primary users of a contract (Sarhan et al., 2014); it is the project 
parties’ ability to capture their meaning which is fundamental for contract 
performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). In general, textual complexity of 
standard forms of contract, in terms of readability and comprehensiveness, may lead 
to misinterpretation and lack of common understanding between project parties; thus 
supporting arms’ length relationships and potential time-consuming and costly 
disputes (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007). Additionally, one of the major critiques 
concerning the adoption of standard form of contracts is associated with the 
dominance of adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms within many of these 
contracts (Mante et al., 2012). Furthermore, the availability of adjudication clauses as 
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contained in standard forms of contract make disputes a less disruptive action for the 
parties concerned (Love et al., 2010); thereby hindering collaboration efforts. 
In summary, it seems that the problems of standard forms of contract outweigh its 
advantages. The heavy reliance on the use of standard forms of contract, established 
by third parties, brings with it lots of formality and rigidity that stifles cooperation 
and focusses on the individual parties and their responsibilities; thereby driving a 
distance between project parties and encouraging opportunistic behaviour (Eriksson 
et al., 2008). According to Cox and Thompson (1997, p. 132): 
 “…Standard forms of contract are nothing more than instruments used by the 
parties to seek strict liability and attach blame to events as they occur. 
Nevertheless, the industry's hands are tied to the standard forms and their 
traditional methods of contracting, even though they do not deliver 
satisfactory results. These methods, when linked with the prevailing 
adversarial culture and fragmented structure lead the parties away from 
'trust' towards self-seeking interest ('opportunism')”. 
Nonetheless, Eriksson and Laan, (2007) suggest that the deep-rooted practice of 
using standard contracts in construction is only harmful, if they are used as 
“safeguards” in the absence of strong “relational norms”. Without good relationships 
between the project-parties, once a default occurs, they are most likely to refer back 
to the clauses of the standard contract which, in turn, may encourage opportunism and 
lead to adversarial ways of working (i.e. remedies of damages through legal actions).  
A recent example of this in the UK occurred in signalling renewal contracts for 
London Underground reported by Connor (2015). The first project went significantly 
over budget and programme along with technical difficulties. The same team, 
technology and contract conditions were used on a second project which finished 
significantly ahead of schedule and under budget. The project team attributed this 
success to putting the contract in a drawer and concentrating on working together to 
solve problems. This experience certainly questions the usefulness of contracts in 
production and emphasises the divide between the creative, problem solving delivery 
process and the safeguarding commercial process as described by Sarhan et al. (2014). 
This separation was confirmed independently through discussions with a large 
engineering design consultancy beginning to engage with lean. Team meetings had 
revealed a significant difference in the understanding of purpose across the business – 
one of the most useful aspects of bringing people together from different departments 
within the organisation to have conversations around purpose was the resulting 
changed perceptions about the business. This also confirms that project design and 
delivery becomes effective when it comprises a set of conversation acts rather than 
relying on documented directives. 
CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT 
In construction, there seems to be two general approaches to selecting a procurement 
system. The first would focus on designing a project organisation structure including 
a project operating system based on project needs and priorities, and then adapting a 
contractual arrangement that aligns the commercial interests of the project parties (e.g. 
Thomsen et al., 2010) - a production oriented approach which aims to design and 
enhance flow processes (Koskela and Sharpe, 1994). The second is a risk based 
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approach which is mainly concerned with overcoming transactional governance 
problem and considers 'risk' to be the main criterion influencing procurement 
selection decisions. Advocators of this approach (e.g. Hibberd and Basden, 1996), 
cited in Love et al. (1998), suggest that contractual arrangements should be primarily 
conducted for risk allocation and mitigation purposes. Thus, a debate exists in 
literature upon whether procurement arrangements should be adapted to support 
production system requirements or tailored to transactional characteristics.  
In construction, there is no ready-made product to buy (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). 
Both the client and the project-supply-chain have to interact in order to create the 
final product. Hence, there are substantial trends towards collaborative ways of 
working as a means for improving project outcomes; it is therefore important to 
consider how construction clients and companies tend to protect (safeguard) their 
project-specific assets, against opportunism, during procurement procedures. Very 
little, if any studies, have sought to question the efficiency and effectiveness of 
safeguards crafted by contracting parties in construction procurement. Based on a 
comprehensive literature review various safeguarding approaches were identified 
(Table 1) and their impact on project performance and outcomes are analysed (Fig. 2).  
Table 1: A categorisation of various safeguarding approaches within construction 
procurement according to their underpinning theoretical perspective and level of 
prevalence 
Conventional  safeguarding approaches 
based on 'risk allocation' considerations 
Less prevalent safeguarding approaches 
based on 'process flow' considerations 
Standard forms of contract Relational contracting 
Use of Disclaimer/Exculpatory clauses Shared risks and rewards 
Traditional insurance arrangements  Single project insurance  
Collateral warranties Latent defects insurance 
Surety/Performance bonds 
Pre-qualifications, direct negotiation, and IPD 
(e.g. Thomsen et al., 2010) - thus, no need 
for the use of bonds 
Lump sum and BoQ pricing systems Collaborative costing e.g. TVD (See e.g. Zimina et al., 2012) 
The 'risk averse' safeguarding approaches based on transactional considerations 
offer little incentive for cooperation to emerge; instead they entrench wasteful 
processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle (e.g. 
opportunism, unnecessary premiums, claims and disputes), as shown in Figure 2. By 
tailoring procurement decisions to 'transactional' characteristics, clients (or focal 
companies) concentrate on formal risk allocation, through contractual arrangements, 
in an attempt to maximise their own profits; thereby neglecting the significance of 
maintaining and enhancing the flow of production processes, and overlooking the 
interdependency between project partners in their efforts to maximise value. 
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Figure 2: General potential impacts of the use of imperfect safeguarding approaches 
on project performance and outcomes - Modified from Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional safeguarding processes adopted by construction clients while deciding 
on their procurement options often complicate the problem rather than solve it. This 
study identified a number of imperfect taken for granted safeguarding techniques 
(Table 1) which stifle cooperation, lead to unnecessary costs, and entrench wasteful 
processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle. It seems that 
clients and decision makers, in their attempt to overcome the safeguarding problem, 
mainly focus their attention and efforts on reducing ex-ante (i.e. pre-construction 
phase) transaction costs while giving less attention to the impact of their chosen 
procurement arrangements on ex-post costs. In that way, procurement decisions tend 
to be ultimately focussed on contract administration and shifting risks; and, arguably, 
risk aversion often distracts attention away from core efficiency purposes 
(Williamson, 1985).  That steps are taken to avoid risk and minimise cost seems to 
satisfy the need for decision makers to be accountable regardless of the effect of these 
actions. This continuing adherence to imperfect conventional procurement procedures 
is also due to institutional pressure exerted from third parties (e.g. consultants, 
quantity surveyors, lawyers, insurance companies, banks) who may have a vested 
interest (i.e. social and/or economic motivations) for the wide-spread use of these 
inefficient procurement procedures. These factors combine to create the coherent 
current model for construction project delivery and their identification will help the 
development of new business models that embrace lean. 
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